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PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Introduction
PROF. COFFEE: We are now going to take up punitive damages,
which this year, frankly, is the tenderloin issue. There are going to be
dramatic developments in this field, and to give you a preview of what
may happen we're going to have Paul Dubow of Dean Witter and Gus
Katsoris who needs no introduction.
Paul is an active litigator with Dean Witter, has represented the Securities Industry Association for some time at the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration, and has worked on its drafting committee.
Gus, of course, has been working on SICA since it was invented and
has probably forgotten more about arbitration than I'l ever know.
Both of them are in a good position to predict for us what the
Supreme Court is going to do.
If we can, I want to force people to tell us what the courts are going
to do because I'm never right and I want you people to be wrong also.
Panelists
MR. DUBOW: First of all, I guess the bottom line here is whether
punitive damages should apply at all in arbitration. In my view, arbitration is a forum for adjudication, not a forum for punishment. Punitive damages are a form of punishment.
Now, let's look back at the history of punitive damages-how they
began. They were designed by the state to punish wrongdoers. They
were developed to punish defendants who were willing to act in an
outrageous fashion because the risk of paying compensatory damages
was far outweighed by the fruit of their outrageous conduct. So, the
power to award punitive damages against these defendants was the
only practical way of restraining their conduct. It had its pitfalls, but
at that point there was no other way to do it.
In those days, when we first had punitive damages, there were no
regulatory bodies of any consequence to regulate conduct in a particular industry. There were no statutes that had punitive restrictions to
them, such as RICO2' or the Sherman Antitrust Act. 4 And so, for
that reason there developed the concept of punitive damages. Obviously, that concept has its flaws. For one thing, a victim could obtain a
windfall while other victims, who for some reason or another were
unable to sue or sue successfully, would not be compensated for that
outrageous conduct.
240. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961

(1988).

241. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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Another problem with punitive damages is that it may be unfair to a
defendant who is adequately punished in a first lawsuit, and then is
required to pay punitive damages again and again in subsequent suits.
So, now we look at the securities industry. In the securities industry, there is an ability to punish a wrongdoer. It's put on the back
burner a lot by people, but, the fact is, it's a very strong deterrent to
members of the industry and a bigger deterrent than the payment of
punitive damages.
I can speak for my own firm. Only about a month ago, we paid a
$50,000 fine to the Exchange. The main reason was that we were late
in filing about three percent of our U-5s. a We spent more on legal
fees and time trying to negotiate that fine, and then we had to spend
time answering to our own people and to others why we did this. This
had a greater effect than a punitive damages award. Punitive damage
awards tend to get in the papers and the next day they are forgotten.
But, the disciplinary process in the industry is very strong and it is a
very real one, more so today than it ever has been.
Furthermore, even in arbitration, the arbitrators have the power to
make disciplinary referrals. They do so today in all of the fora. In
fact, they can make a disciplinary referral even if the brokerage firm
wins the case. For example, they may find that a plaintiff cannot recover on a claim of unauthorized trading because the plaintiff ratified
the conduct of the broker. The broker nonetheless committed a violation of the securities laws or the Exchange rules. Therefore, in that
case, it is quite possible that the arbitrators, while finding for the respondent on the ground of ratification, could still issue a disciplinary
referral and, in fact, they have done so. I've seen it.
Even if arbitrators fail to make a referral for discipline in an arbitration, but award $5000 or more to that plaintiff, that begets a filing in
the Central Records Depository ("CRD") system via a U-4243 if the
employee is still with the firm or a U-5 if that person is not with the
firm. If the award is $15,000 or more, then what's called an RE-3244
has to be filed with the New York Stock Exchange. And, I know that
the New York Stock Exchange investigates every single RE-3 that is
filed.
These avenues are available, and the risk of punishment is always
out there. Ironically, the CRD system and the RE-3 system, to a small
degree, are deterrents to the settlement of cases because an employee
242. Form U-5, Uniform Termination Notice for Securities Industry Registration.
243. Form U-4, Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or
Transfer.
244. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Division of Enforcement, Form RE-3. Whenever a securities or commodities-related civil litigation or arbitration is disposed of by
judgement, award, or settlement for an amount exceeding $15,000, it is considered a
reportable event under New York Stock Exchange Rule 351, and, therefore, a Form

RE-3 must be filed with the New York Stock Exchange, reporting the defendant or
respondent to the Exchange. NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 351, J 2351.
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may not want to settle a case while the employer may want to settle
because the settlement affects the employee's record when he or she
has to file a U-4 or an RE-3. The point is, there is an adequate means
of punishment out there in the securities industry. There is no need to
have, on top of that, an additional punishment with all its draw-backs
in the form of punitive damages.
Those who support the right of claimants to be awarded punitive
damages in arbitration state that they should have the same right in
arbitration that they have in court. If they can get punitive damages
in court, they should be able to do so in arbitration. If you examine
those arguments, however, you find that is not what they're saying.
What they're saying is that they want more rights.
All you have to do is look at the briefs in the Mastrobuono24 5 case.
The plaintiff and the amici briefs argue that punitive damages should
be available in all arbitration fora no matter what jurisdiction that arbitration is filed in. That means that a plaintiff could be awarded punitive damages in any of the nine states in which he or she could not
obtain punitive damages in court; or, be awarded any amount of punitive damages in the seven states that cap punitive damages; or, keep
the full amount of the punitive damages award in the two states that
require a portion of the punitive damages award go to the state; or, be
awarded punitive damages on any cause of action, including a violation of federal securities laws, without proving any standard to establish alleged outrageous conduct.
You may be surprised when I say that, but under the present system, a plaintiff can obtain punitive damages merely by alleging a 10b-5
violation in arbitration, even though he or she couldn't do so in
court,2' because arbitrators don't have to follow the law. If you are a
respondent and the plaintiff only sued you for a 10b-5 violation and
obtained a punitive damage award, there is no way you could get that
award vacated.
You may have heard of manifest disregard of the law as a ground
for vacation. However, the Federal Arbitration Act24 7 and the Uniform Arbitration Act2' have five or six specific requirements for va245. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., No. 94-18, 1995 U.S. LEXIS
1820, at *21 (U.S. March 6, 1995), rev'g 20 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1994). Petitioner's brief
available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 646148. Respondent's brief available in
WESTLAW, 1994 WL 699700.
246. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that punitive damages cannot be recovered in a suit under Rule 10b-5), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
977 (1969); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970) (same).
The plaintiff, however, may be able to recover punitive damages pursuant to a pendent cause of action under state law joined with the lOb-5 action. Richard W. Jennings, et al., Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials 1347 (7th ed. 1992) (citing
Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1972) and Cyrak v. Lemon, 919 F.2d 320
(5th Cir. 1990)).
247. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
248. Unit Arbitration Act, 7 U.L.A. §§ 1-25 (1985 & Supp. 1994).
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cation of awards,1 9 none of which include manifest disregard of the
law. There have been some awards reversed on that ground, but they
are very few and far between.1 0
There are certain fallacies raised with respect to the issue of punitive damages. One fallacy is that it is the only way by which a plaintiff
in an arbitration matter can be made whole. Perhaps so, but that is
really an argument for the English rule.251 Another fallacy that we
hear primarily from lawyers is that punitive damages are the best way
by which the industry can be punished for its outrageous conduct.
That sounds pretty good except that they rarely state that it is the best
way by which they are compensated.
Let me give you this example. We had a meeting at the NASD
about six or eight months ago that included the plaintiff's bar and the
defense bar. By the way, I personally enjoyed that meeting. I felt it
was very good to meet members of the plaintiff's bar, and there was a
lot of mutual respect at that meeting. I hope we would have more of
them to discuss mutual issues.
One of the things that I suggested was that if we are going to have
punitive damages in arbitration, let the award go into a fund. Let's
establish some kind of investors education fund and all punitive damage awards could go in that fund.
Initially that sounded pretty good. Then somebody said well, okay,
but we still want to get our contingent fees. We lawyers who bring
these suits still want to get our one-third or forty percent or whatever
the case may be. I am one of the few defense lawyers who favors a
contingent fee for plaintiffs' lawyers. I really think it is necessary, believe it or not. I'm probably a minority of one on that issue, but I do
believe that.
But, why should there be a one-third recovery? The plaintiff's lawyer could be paid his or her hourly rate for obtaining the punitive
damage award, but there should be subtracted from that amount the
amount paid as a contingent fee for compensatory reward. If we did
249. The Federal Arbitration Act includes five grounds warranting vacation of an
award: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) there
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators; (3) the arbitrators were guilty

of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; (4) the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made; or (5) where an award is
vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to be made has

not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators. 9
U.S.C. § 10.
250. See Brad A. Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in
Federal Court: Contemplating the Use and Utility of the "Manifest Disregard" of the
Law Standard, 27 Ind. L. Rev. 241 (1993).
251. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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that, I'm sure one hundred percent of the punitive damage award
would go into this fund.
The point I'm trying to make is that a lot of lawyers who are in
favor of punitive damages in arbitration are in favor of that because
it's a good way of compensation for them, and not necessarily because
it also well compensates the plaintiffs. If I were a plaintiff's lawyer, I
would have the same viewpoint. I'm just saying that it is a fact of life.
There is an absence of due process with respect to the award of
punitive damages in arbitration. It applies to all arbitration, not just
securities arbitration. If you look at the Supreme Court cases on the
subject and you compare it to arbitration, you see that.
In the Haslip'-z case, the Supreme Court affirmed an award of punitive damages that was issued by an Alabama court. In doing so, it said
that the procedures in Alabama were satisfactory and did not violate
due process. The court listed seven criteria that presumably assured
that the process, or that the method, of awarding punitive damages in
that state did not violate due process. 53 None of those seven criteria
exists in arbitration. None of them.
Arbitrators have complete discretion to award punitive damages in
securities arbitration. They can award them for, as I mentioned earlier, a violation of federal securities laws, even though the statute does
not permit an award of punitive damages. I know of one case where a
punitive damage award was issued because the arbitrator said that the
defense attorney had failed to respond to a request for production of
documents. That's not a ground to award punitive damages. Perhaps
it is a ground to have the attorney referred to the state bar disciplinary
committee.
In that particular case, all the attorney was doing was exercising the
attorney's right to object to a request for production of documents.
The plaintiff's lawyer in that case had not even asked the panel to rule
on the objections made by the defense attorney. Nevertheless, a punitive damage award was issued in that case. Maybe it was an extreme
situation, but it does illustrate what could happen in arbitration where
punitive damage awards are allowed.
One may argue that arbitration is a private matter between contracting parties, and therefore, there is no state action. Of course, as
we all know, in order to have a violation of due process, there must be
some sort of state action.'
If you don't think there is state action in securities arbitration, then
I suggest that you read the SEC brief in Mastrobuono. 5 The SEC
252. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
253. Id.at 21-22.

254. See Ware, supra note 133, at 559-67 ("Numerous courts have held that the
state action element of a due process claim is not present in arbitration.").
255. See SEC Brief, supra note 3, at 7, 10-12.
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talks about section 21(f)4.256 That is the section of the NASD rules
that states that a customer's rights cannot be taken away by a contract
in arbitration. And in order to uphold 21(f)4, the SEC says that 21(f)4
25 7
has the effect of federal law because it was approved by the SEC.
That aspect of that brief is correct. It is federal law.
Furthermore, if all the brokerage firms got rid of their arbitration
agreements, they'd still have to arbitrate because they are members of
SROs. SROs have arbitration requirements that can be taken advantage of by the customers of those brokerage firms. They can do nothing about that because they are compelled by, in essence, federal law
to become members of the SROs if they want to do business as brokerage firms in this country.
There is state action with respect to at least securities arbitration.
Perhaps, in other areas, not, but in securities arbitration it is clearly so.
Therefore, the argument about due process is a valid one. There is
clearly no due process.
I think it is also clear that punitive damages prolong arbitration.
There have been arguments that the threat of punitive damages shortens the process because the fear of having a punitive damage award
will make a respondent settle the case.
To a degree that's true, but only if both sides, the claimant and the
respondent, agree that there is punitive liability. If the respondent
thinks that it is liable and could face a punitive damage award, I suppose that respondent will try to settle the case as best it can. But, if
the respondent does not believe it will be subjected to a punitive damages award, rightly or wrongly, and the claimant, rightly or wrongly,
does believe that it has a punitive damages claim, the case will not
settle. And, that's the majority of cases.
If anything, the concept, or the prospect, of punitive damages prolongs the arbitration process-hinders the arbitration process. It does
not enhance it, in my view.
Finally, Robert Clemente has asked me to comment about what I
think would happen post-Mastrobuono. I hate to disappoint, but I really can't say. Furthermore, I was talking to Mark Maddox at lunch,
and neither one of us could figure out how the case is going to go. It
could be reversed or affirmed in so many different ways that will affect
what happens next in different ways.
For example, the Supreme Court could reverse simply by saying
that 21(f)4 is part of the contract, that it supersedes the New York
choice-of-law clause in the contract, and stop right there. That means
256. NASD Rules of Fair Practice § 21(f)4; see also NYSE Rules, supra note 14,
Rule 636(d), 2636 (prohibiting limitations on the ability of a party to file a claim in
arbitration); Uniform Code, supra note 14, § 31(d), at 24 (same).
257. See SEC Brief, supra note 3, at 7, 10-12.
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that the issue of due process will not be raised. Where will we be
then?
The Court also could find that the New York choice-of-law was superseded by 21(f)4, but that 21(04 cannot be the basis for a punitive
damage award because such award would be a violation of due process.25s That can happen too.
I don't know what's going to happen in the case, but I will say this:
If the industry were to achieve a victory in Mastrobuono so that it
could eliminate the ability of plaintiffs to obtain punitive damages in
arbitration, I think the industry should give the public a method by
which it could utilize the court system.
For example, perhaps there could be a system whereby certain types
of accounts would have arbitration agreements and others wouldn't.
Margin accounts, perhaps, could be the subject of arbitration agreements. They are not the majority of the types of accounts that are in
brokerage firms. On the other hand, an IRA account would not be
subject to an arbitration agreement.1 9 Most of the partnership cases
we saw at Prudential and other firms did not come out of margin accounts. Perhaps they wouldn't have been arbitrated. Who knows?
But that's one possibility.
Another issue that we have to think about, post-Mastrobuono, is
the proposed Common Sense Legal Reform Act.m Even if that does
pass, does it affect arbitration? I read it in a very cursory fashion, so I
really didn't study it that well. Although it says that it does apply to
the federal securities acts, it does not apply to arbitration.
Even if the Act were passed, it's possible that all of the things that
are in that Act would not apply to securities arbitration or perhaps
only apply to those causes of action that allege violation of securities
laws. So, I don't know where we're going to go from there, although I
do see a trend in this country toward some sort of litigation reform.
That may supersede whatever happens in Mastrobuono. Thank you.
PROF. KATSORIS: Of the seven topics covered in the Symposium, punitive damages is the only one that's being covered both days.
I think that's because of the timeliness of the issue, namely Mastrobuono, and also because the subject is complex and the resultant
consequences are very, very serious.

258. The Court, in fact, found an amibiguity created by the New York choice-of-law
provision in the customer agreement and so construed the ambiguous language
"against the interest of the party that drafted it." Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., No. 94-18, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 1820, at *18 (U.S. March 6, 1995) (citations
omitted).

259. See 1992 GAO Report, supra note 54, at 28-29 (giving statistics on use of predispute arbitration agreements).
260. H.R. 10, supra note 167.
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At the first session on punitive damages on November 21st,2 61 I methodically went through the cases, and I don't want to repeat myself in
this presentation. I want my presentation today to reflect what happened at the first session and build on it. I will also respond to Paul as
I go along.
I basically staked out what I thought was the public's position,
which is that if you can get punitive damages in court, you should be
allowed to get the same relief in arbitration. I was then, and I continue to be, willing to talk about safeguards against run-away panels.
On the other hand, my very good friend John Peloso eloquently
explained two weeks ago the evils of punitive damages, drew a line in
the sand, and posted a sign that said no punitive damages should be
allowed in arbitration, under any circumstances.
I look at it a little differently. When SICA adopted the Uniform
Code,262 its goal was to keep arbitration economical and speedy and
achieve uniformity among the self-regulatory organizations ("SROs").
It was never intended to be used as a vehicle to eliminate remedies a
customer already had in court through the use of restrictive clauses
inserted into what is basically a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreement.
I say mandatory because, other than in cash accounts, a customer
basically must sign one of these agreements to open an account.263
Indeed, last week in the Wall Street Journal,there was a feature article
that highlighted the inclusion of two such restrictive clauses in a recent
arbitration agreement of a major brokerage house. 2 "
The first of such restrictions provided: "The foregoing agreement
to arbitrate does not entitle me to obtain arbitration of claims that
would be barred by the relevant statutes of limitations if such claims
were brought in a court of competent jurisdiction."265
I assume what the brokerage firm is attempting to do with that
clause is to litigate the so-called six-year rule 266 in court instead of it
being decided by the arbitrators.
More importantly, that agreement contained a second restrictive
clause that provided, in part:
This Agreement... shall be governed and construed in accordance
with the laws of the State of New York, including, but not limited to,
the law of New York regarding the permissible rates of interest that
may be charged and the law of New York regarding damages recov261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See supra pp. 1571-94.
See supra note 14.
See 1992 GAO Report, supra note 54, at 28.
Sicinolfi, supra note 109, at C1.
Id.
For a discussion of the six-year rule, see supra pp. 1533-50.
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erable 26
in7 arbitration, without giving effect to principles of conflicts
of law

This so-called New York choice-of-law provision apparently is used
irrespective of where the customer resides, and even if the transaction
were consummated outside of New York, for example, on the Pacific
Stock Exchange.
Interestingly, the clause specifically highlights New York interest
rates and the law of New York regarding damages recoverable in arbitration. Nowhere are the terrible words "punitive damages" used, nor
is the lay customer specifically advised of the Garrity? prohibition.
When questioned by the author of the article, the spokesperson for
the brokerage firm responded in part, "We're not trying to take overreaching advantage of clients, but this is still a business."''

9

He said,

what the firm is trying to do is take whatever protection is necessary
and "to try to be in the spirit or at least the body of the law. '""O
You can interpret that statement in a lot of ways. To me it means let
the customer beware.
I don't think that's the kind of message that the industry wants to
give to the public. If I were Knute Rockne and this were a football
game, I would plaster that industry lawyer's statement on the locker
of every public customer.
Nearly three years ago SICA passed a rule amending the Uniform
Code to provide that arbitrators may grant any relief they deem just
and equitable.27 ' That rule was intended merely to codify the already
inherent powers of arbitrators to grant whatever relief a claimant
could get in court. I might add that the American Arbitration Association already had a similar rule as to arbitrators' authority. 2'
When the SICA rule went to the various SROs for respective board
approvals, it was ambushed by what has been aptly described as the
corporate equivalent of a drive-by shooting. The battle lines were
drawn.
It made no sense to fight duplicative, simultaneous battles at the ten
SROs, so the NASD, which has the most cases, undertook, with the
tacit approval of the other SROs, to enter into a dialogue to see if this
issue could be resolved consensually, taking into consideration the legitimate concerns of both sides.
267. Siconolfi, supra note 109, at C1.
268. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that arbitrators cannot award punitive damages).
269. Siconolfi, supra note 109, at Cl (emphasis added) (quoting a lawyer representing Smith Barney).
270. Id. (same).
271. Uniform Code, supra note 14, § 28(h), at 21.
272. See, e.g., American Arbitration Association, Securities Arbitration Rules
§ 42(c), AAA164-20M-4/93, available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 495385, at *12 ("The
arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable
and within the scope of the agreement of the parties .. ").
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The NASD grappled with this issue for over two years, and this
summer distributed to its membership Notice 94-54, which I distributed, and which in effect identified alternative solutions that were
then being discussed.273 For three long years we were all patient because we felt that some progress was being made. Regretfully, however, the inflexible position taken by the industry at the November
21st session of this Symposium, that punitive damages should not be
allowed under any circumstances, brings us back to square one.
If that's true, then three years of dialogue have been wasted, and I
personally think that the industry missed a golden window of opportunity to forge a rule we can all live with. Now, the Supreme Court will
tell us what we must do. Personally, I feel that the Court will decide
the issue in favor of the public. Like Paul, I'm not sure on what
ground the Court will decide this case. It could decide on the basis of
the Federal Arbitration Act, or an interpretation of Volt,274 or that
Garrity275 is outdated, or on the doctrine of adhesion, 76 or any
number of other grounds.
Keep in mind, Garrity was a four-to-three decision that was rendered one year before the creation of SICA, and eleven years before
McMahon, when arbitration was still basically voluntary and its procedures still suspect by the courts, as evidenced by the Wilko decision. 7
Indeed, when you analyze Garrity,it said that there are no punitive
damages allowable
in arbitration even though the parties have agreed
271
otherwise.
It is ironic that the industry is saying that the public is
freely agreeing to the Garrity ban on punitive damages, yet the Garrity
majority specifically states that the parties cannot consent to punitive
damages.
If Garrity will not allow the parties to agree on punitive damages,
why should a state outside of New York let the parties agree that Garrity applies, since Garrity itself does not permit freedom of choice on
this issue? Nor is Garrity immune from attack even within the bor-

ders of New York. Last year, the Arbitration Committee of the New
York County Lawyer's Association recommended to the New York
Legislature that Garrity be overturned. 7 9 Enough on Garrity.
There are at least two other issues before the Supreme Court in
Mastrobuono. First, there are the SRO rules themselves. Section
31 of the SICA Code specifically prohibits restrictive clauses in
273. National Association of Securities Dealers, NASD Notice to Members 94-54
(July 1994).

274. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
275. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).

276. See John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 9-44 (3d
ed. 1987).

277. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
278. Garrity,353 N.E.2d at 794 (citation omitted).
279. New York County Lawyers' Association, Committee on Arbitration and
ADR, Punitive Damages: A Proposal For Relief 9 (July 12, 1993).
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customers' ageements that limit the ability of the arbitrators to make
any award.28§ I think that statement is self-explanatory.,,'
Secondly, the Supreme Court should give greater concern to the
issue of adhesion. One of the judicially imposed limitations on the
enforcement of adhesion contracts is that even if the provisions are
within the reasonable expectations of the parties, they will be denied
enforcement if, considered in context, they are found to be unduly
oppressive, unconscionable, or against public policy3 s
Keep in mind that before McMahon, the basic effect of enforcing
arbitration agreements was that you had to resolve your dispute
before a particular SRO instead of going to court. This is not necessarily unduly oppressive or unconscionable on its face.
But now, the consequences have escalated to where the result is not
only that you must come into SRO arbitration, but then we'll start
cherry-picking your rights or remedies away. The brokerage agreement I described earlier does just that, and if allowed to stand, will
mark the beginning of the erosion of the public's rights and remedies.
What other similar restrictive clauses does the industry have in store
for the public? Somehow those words of the industry attorney keep
ringing in my ear: "We're not trying to take overreaching advantage
of clients, but this is still a business.1'' 2 3 That kind of philosophy will
only rekindle the Wilko court's distrust of arbitration. z To repeat: I
predict that the Mastrobuono decision will favor the public.
Could I be wrong? Of course I could be wrong. It's an occupational hazard that we all learn to live with. I've been wrong before.
I've eaten crow before. Besides, being Mediterranean, if you put a
little olive oil, garlic, and oregano on it, crow doesn't taste so bad.
Enough of the polemics. As I said at the last session, no matter how
Mastrobuono turns out, each side must accommodate the other on this
most sensitive issue. Otherwise, we begin going down the slippery
slope where we will once again make arbitration strictly voluntary.
The time for stonewalling is over. The Maginot line2 5 defense
failed in World War II. It is similarly going to fail if applied in securities arbitration. I would like today to put aside the gauntlet and in280. Uniform Code, supra note 14, § 31(d), at 24; see also NYSE Rules, supra note
14, Rule 636(d), '12636.
281. The NASD recently warned its members not to use any agreement that limits
the arbitrators' ability to make an award. NASD Issues Warning About Clauses In

PredisputeArbitrationAgreements, 27 See. Reg. & L. Rep. 473 (1995).
282. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 276, §§ 9-41 to 9-46.
283. Siconolfi, supra note 109, at Cll.
284. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
285. The Maginot Line was a mighty system of fixed fortifications along the eastern
frontier of France. See The Columbia Encyclopedia 1658 (5th ed. 1993). "Like fortified lines since the Great Wall of China, the chief effect it had was to create a false
sense of security; it could not eliminate the necessity for mobile warfare, and that
particular lesson was thoroughly learned after the French collapse of 1940." Id.
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stead offer an olive branch. No matter how Mastrobuono turns out, it
will not, in the long run, solve the issue with finality.
In this connection, I would like to get back to NASD Notice 94-54
and use it as a platform from which to launch a dialogue. It discussed
seven alternative proposals as possibilities, and that's what they really
are, possibilities. I would like to offer my thoughts on the seven possibilities listed, then Pd like to hear from the industry on whether
there is room for any dialogue, because no matter how Mastrobuono
turns out, we're going to be back at the table. The Supreme Court is
not going to solve all of the problems.
I'll just briefly go through the various suggestions.
First: Rationalefor the Award of Punitive Damages. We need a record. I've always felt that we should have a record of all arbitration
proceedings. To the extent that punitive damages are involved, I
think, even more so, we need a good record. To the extent that punitive damages may some day become appealable, a good record becomes absolutely mandatory.
As far as a standard or a written opinion as to punitive damages, I
think that's negotiable, and I would like to defer, as Paul said, to see
what happens with tort reform and a standard generally.
Second: Appeals. The suggestion here is that the appeal process be
within the NASD itself-an internal appeal. I think appeals are coming if we're going to keep punitive damages in arbitration, but I oppose an internal appeal, because if you are now having image
problems on the selection of arbitrators at the trial level, you're going
to multiply them ten-fold by having to select somebody to sit in an
elite appellate capacity within an SRO forum. For example, will we
set up criteria for challenging such appellate arbitrators, be it peremptory or for cause?
So, I don't think we should set up an appeal structure within the
SRO. I think that the punitive portion of an award should be appealable to the courts.'
Third: Arbitrator Training.'a I think we all agree that's an area
where we've got to get together and improve it, particularly regarding
punitive damages.
Fourth: Standardfor Award of Punitive Damages. Again, that's negotiable, and I think I would have to defer to overall tort reform.
Fifth: Bifurcation. The NASD Notice suggests bifurcating the punitive damages portion of the proceedings. I oppose such separation on
the ground that you would greatly delay the proceeding and significantly add to its cost. So, I oppose bifurcation. If you are hearing the
case, you hear the whole case once, at one time.
286. In order to set up an appeal structure to the courts, an amendment to the
Federal Arbitration Act would likely be necessary.

287. For a discussion of arbitrator training, see infra pp. 1679-94.
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Sixth: Caps on Awards for PunitiveDamages. I think that's negotiable. I think, however, we have to defer such discussion pending tort
reform generally, and then pick it up from there.
It bothers me when someone spills some coffee on herself and gets a
2.7 million dollar punitive damage award because the coffee is too
hot.2 8 I can truly understand the need for some dialogue in this
regard.
Seventh: Sharing Punitive Damage Awards with Regulators. Interesting concept. Two weeks ago I think we discussed it and a suggestion was made that maybe some portion of the punitive damage award
should go to the SROs to help defray the cost of the arbitration process. I think you would have a very serious conflict-of-interest problem if the SRO is the administrator of the forum where punitive
damages are awarded, and the monies come back to it. Again, this
sharing concept may be negotiable, but only as part of overall tort
reform. I would defer to see what they are going to do to overall tort
reform before we can discuss this.
Finally, I have one additional suggestion, and that's something
that's been kicked around, namely: making arbitration voluntary
where there are punitive damages sought. In other words, if you want
punitive damages, you'd be allowed to opt out and go to court. You
can keep the present system as it is, but if you allege punitive damages, then you would be allowed the option of going to court.
The Prudential global settlement with the SEC289 has opted away
two important rights: the defense cannot assert statute of limitations,
and the plaintiff cannot claim punitive damages, but participating in
that procedure is optional, not mandatory. I don't see how you can
make arbitration mandatory and exclude punitive damages.
Again, I offer an olive branch, but I am prepared to defend my turf.
In any event, I really would like to see this dialogue move forward. I
think we've wasted three years. We're all now looking at Mastrobuono like it is going to solve all the problems, and I don't think it
will.
Discussion
MR. DUBOW: I disagree with you that the dialogue was wasted.
The dialogue could have lasted three years, but regardless, I do believe that those meetings that we had with both sides of the bar pres288. Big Jury Award For Coffee Burn, N.Y. Tmes, Aug. 19, 1994, at D5 (awarding
2.7 million dollars in punitive damages to an 81-year-old woman who suffered thirddegree burns after coffee spilled on her lap); McDonalds Cup of Scalding Coffee: $2.9
Million Award, Chli. Trib., Aug. 18, 1994, at C1. The trial judge subsequently reduced
the punitive award to $480,000. See Judge Reduces Award in Coffee Scalding Case,
Chi. Trib., Sept. 14, 1994, at C2.
289. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Prudential Sec. Inc., C.A. No. 93-2164
(D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1994) (Fourth Quarterly Report of Claims Administrator).
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ent were good meetings, and, as I mentioned earlier, I hope they
continue.
There were no polemics at those meetings. They were very professional. There was disagreement obviously, but oddly enough, certain
other ideas came out of those meetings, not involving punitive damages, where there was some mutual agreement. So, I believe that they
were useful, and I also agree with you that dialogue should continue.
On the issue of the Smith Barney contract, I am mildly amused by
the reaction to that.2" As you pointed out, there were three basic
elements to that agreement that appear to be "restrictive." The first
one is the statute of limitations. It said that the statute of limitations
that applies shall be the one that the person could obtain in a court or
that was available in a court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore,
what Smith Barney was saying, as far as I can determine, is that the
same statute of limitations that is a defense in court would be a defense in arbitration. How is this a restriction? If you take the argument that it is a restriction to a logical conclusion, what you are saying
is that you want the claimants to have greater rights, i.e., no statute of
limitations in arbitration, even though they are available in court.
The second "restriction" pertains to interest, and I'm not quite sure
where that comes out. This is one of the ironies of the whole debate.
The reason why the law of New York was put into the contracts is
that, way back before all of us were born, the State of New York had a
much more liberal rate of interest for margin accounts than other
states. This is before the issue of a national rule on interest.
So, the brokerage firms wanted New York law to apply because
they were paying a certain rate to get the money. They added a point
or two to that money to get their own interest. And that was higher
than the usury limitations in every state except New York. So, that's
why that was there. I suspect that's the same reason why it is there
now, though I'm not sure about that.
The third element of the contract is the punitive damages element.
I will agree that if that section were applied to a client, let's say from
Illinois where Mastrobuono comes from, and we agree that punitive
damages was a right, then that would be a restriction. But ironically
that contract is a better contract than the contract at issue in Mastrobuono. The contract at issue in Mastrobuono simply said the law of
New York applies, while the Smith Barney contract points you in the
direction of damages. So, I don't understand the hullabaloo about
that contract.
As far as the interest in the phrase, "just and equitable," that goes
back to the days before punitive damages in arbitration were common. When arbitration first began, as I think Judith pointed out when
we first began, the objective was to have an expert come in who could
290. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
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adjudicate the case and render a just and equitable decision. There
were no defenses based on the statute of limitations, ratification, or
other issues. It was just a matter of the facts, and the arbitrator would
decide.
Punitive damages has complicated that. The Garrity case, which has
been charged to be a case that's hostile to arbitration, isn't hostile to
arbitration. The court decided, in New York, that arbitrators should
not have the power to award punitive damages, because the usefulness
of arbitration would be destroyed if punitive damages were allowed to
be decided by the arbitrators.
The court in New York was trying to enhance arbitration by letting
it remain cheaper and more efficient than court action. I think it is a
fact that punitive damages do not make arbitration cheaper and more
efficient to try.
Now, with respect to the issue of appeal, that would solve the due
process problem. But then again, as somebody pointed out earlier today, it takes away from the efficiency of arbitration.
Secondly, Gus, I don't know how we could have a contract, and
perhaps you've thought of a way, I've been unable to do so, which
provides for an appeal to the courts, because the statutes don't allow
that. You could provide for a trial de novo, I believe. You could have
a contract that provided for a trial de novo in court if a punitive damage award was rendered, but you can't provide, as far as I can figure
out, for an appeal. You have to amend the statutes to do that, and
that may be a major process.
And so, I don't know, maybe it is desirable. I am not saying it is or
is not, but I don't think it is, at this point, viable. Therefore, I don't
know what we can do about it.
The point is, and this is my final point, there would not be an argument on punitive damages really, ironically, if the same rules that applied in court applied in arbitration, but that's not what's asked for
here.
PROF. COFFEE: Before I open this to comments, and this has
been an interesting exchange of views, I'm interested to see if we can
push this forward prospectively because there are aspects to both of
your comments that suggest there might be some middle ground. And
some of this may also touch upon areas like arbitrator training, which
we'll get to this afternoon.
Your initial theme really worked off of Haslip, the Supreme Court
decision, and you said that there is a problem with due process. It is
probably a lesser problem to the extent that I can be very worried
about punitive damages in the hands of a jury, but I may be a little bit
less worried about punitive damages in the hands of a trained panel of
arbitrators, particularly after Ted Levine gets through training them
and making them very sensitive. Still, there is some problem there.
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What I hear from Gus is that from his perspective, it's possible to
damages with such things as standards that
to domesticate
try
might
be built into punitive
the Code of Arbitration and some type of internal
appeal mechanism.
Now, you mentioned appeal to a court. There are some problems
with the parties privately, by contract, conferring jurisdiction on a
court. There could be internal mechanisms.
What if we had a code that had most of the Haslip factors, 29 1 and
they were in the hands of arbitrators who probably are as smart and as
good as the average state court judge as in the Haslip case, and we had
new training? Is that the kind of. domestication of punitive damages
you think the industry can live with?
MR. DUBOW: It is a step in the right direction. I think one problem is the quality of the arbitrators. For example, arbitrations traditionally have had at least one arbitrator, if not all of the arbitrators,
who is familiar with the field that is the subject of the arbitration case.
That was the way it was in securities arbitration when we first began,
because initially, I believe, there were two members of the panel that
were from the industry.
Now it is one member of the panel that's from the industry, but
that's still fine if that one member of the panel is really from the industry. However, I rarely have a case in which the industry panelist is
an active member of the industry. More often than not the industry
panelist is a retired person. For example, the reason I have to leave
early today is, I have an arbitration tomorrow, and the industry panelist is a person who retired in 1975 from the industry. 2 2 I know who
this person is, and this person's been out of the industry for years. I
question whether this person has the industry expertise on what's going on today.
Often times the industry panelist is a person who has a license,
maybe a mutual fund salesman working door to door. That's the industry panelist. So, as long as there are such major limitations on the
industry panelists, I still would have some doubts whether that would
work. I'm not saying it wouldn't, and I think it is an avenue to be
explored, but I think we have to address that.
MR. LEVINE: The debate, if you will, which repeats a lot of the
debate that's been going on for a number of years, I think keys up one
or two critical questions that we all assume in order to get to the result
we want.
291. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
292. NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 607(a)(2), 2607 ("An arbitrator will be
deemed as being from the securities industry if he or she:... (iii) is retired from or
spent a substantial part of his or her business career [as a member, broker/dealer,
government securities broker, government securities dealer, municipal securities
dealer or registered investment advisor].").
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And I think the question is, with the jurisprudence of this countrynot only the New York Times article today, but the real experience of
getting to the courts-what are the clients of the firms better off doing? Are they better off in getting their issues addressed by the firms
in an alternative dispute resolution process or not?
I am fundamentally of the view that they are. Even with all the
infrmities of the process, by and large, in today's society and going
forward, the courts are not the avenue for redress; alternative dispute
resolution is.
The debate over whether you can rework the arbitration process to
deal with the issue of punitive damages, I think has been reversed as
to what it should be. Your question, John, fairly posed the right issues. You talk about Haslip, but I read Honda293 as saying that until
you have a process that provides due process and protects all parties,
how can you push and demand punitive damages, as opposed to saying can we create the process to do it?
What I am concerned about is if we took a panel of arbitrators from
this room, which has a lot of very skilled and knowledgeable people,
lawyers and otherwise, and asked them what are punitive damageswhat has the Supreme Court of the United States said as to when they
should be awarded, the standard for awarding them, where they
should go, and how they should be administered-I bet most of this
room would fail, and we in the industry would fail that test. John
Coffee may pass my test, but the rest of us would fail it. A lot of juries
fail it. On appeal these awards are knocked down because they are
misperceived and misunderstood.
My concern about adding to the compromise, which is what you
both suggested, and what I think Paul is alluding to, is that one needs
to understand not only these items in here, but really where you want
to come out in this process. Do you want to have a process that does
resolve disputes quickly, efficiently, and, I think, for the betterment of
both the firms and its clients; or, do you want to recreate a litigation
context in which you are going to bog down, and let's say that constructively, in a process where the results will not be achieved for
weeks, months, or years, which I believe is going to be necessary in
order to put punitive damages comfortably into the arbitration process. Whether it is direction to the arbitrators, skill of arbitrators, the
standard you look for, or how you make the record, it is simply not
recording the proceedings, I would suggest.
What is the standard that will be applied to arbitration? How are
you going to test? Are there rules of evidence when you are talking
about punitive damages, could they be imposed? Who is going to be
the adjudicator of that? How are you going to police the bar?
293. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. C. 2331 (1994).
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There are no remedies really for policing the people advocating.
There's a whole series of issues when you go from alternative dispute
resolution, which is resolving a dispute, to imposing a penalty. There
is no industry in this country, I think in the world, that has more regulations than the securities industry. There isn't any. SEC, states,
SROs, you name it. There is none who has so many people looking.
But the question is, if you are going to impose punitive damages,
how are you going to do it in a manner where you fairly protect both
parties, because I don't believe that only the firms or the individual
defendants or respondents get hurt by punitive damages. I really believe clients will get hurt. They'll get hurt because of delay. They'll
get hurt because of costs. They'll get hurt because there's going to be,
I believe, reversals going the other way because of the extraordinary
remedy it is.
We may end up and probably we have to end up-because philosophically neither the SEC nor the SROs can stand up and say there
are adequate protections for those egregious cases that exist apart
from punitive damages-concluding that you need to provide the protections to get there, to firms, in order for this dialogue to go forward,
and I haven't seen that.
And for Gus, or anyone, to say it is negotiable on caps, this is not a
negotiation. This is not a negotiation between the public and the industry over caps. This is fundamentally the ability of this industry to
survive without protection, and that can't happen.
And I think it is so dramatic that I would urge everyone in the room
to focus on these issues, yes, but to understand the context in which it
is coming out.
In my view, the goal of this group would be not to have punitive
damages in arbitration. What I mean by that, in conclusion, is firms
by and large have to resolve clients' disputes, not in an arbitration
with punitive damages, because if you end up in that circumstance, we
all lose.
The focus has to be on a method of resolving those disputes without
that process in order for us to both keep our clients comfortable and
satisfy the firm and also provide a mechanism to move on, from a cost
perspective. And I urge us all to try to move towards that goal.
PROF. COFFEE: Okay. If I hear you correctly, you're skeptical
that we can marry arbitration and punitive damages because it would
produce delay, and the cost would be borne largely by the client. I'm
summarizing you that way because I want to go back to Gus, who
hasn't really had a full opportunity to reply to Paul's second round,
and see what your response is.
PROF. KATSORIS: I will try to be brief because I think there are
a lot of other people in this room from whom I'd like to hear.
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Paul-briefly on the issue of appeal-yes, if it is going to be appealed to the courts, I think you have to amend the Federal Arbitration Act. If you can't do that politically, then an internal appeal
within the SRO could be possible, as Jack mentioned through an SRO
rule change; but, as I stated before, I don't think an internal appeal is
the way to go.
Ted, on the issue of Honda, I wrote my article, Tower of Babel,29
three years ago-long before Honda, and I thought even then that in
all fairness, appealability should be allowed as part of an overall punitive damages tradeoff. You should not have the prospect of punitive
damages and no appealability whatsoever. I speak for myself, and
that's my opinion. I don't speak for everybody in the public. Just like
you or Paul don't speak for everybody in the industry.
It is my understanding that the industry is putting a lot of reliance
on Honda. Yet, the McMahon case unanimously allowed RICO
claims in arbitration despite the same limitations on appealability,295
and there are treble damages in RICO,2 96 which to me are punitive in
nature.
On the issue of negotiation on some of these issues, it must be made
in good faith. I think a lot could be done through negotiation, but
somebody's got to move. Somebody's got to be a leader. No one
wants to go first. I see a lot of hesitancy on the part of the industry.
No one in the industry wants to be first. Bottom line, however, I think
you've got to keep punitive damages, one way or the other.
Now, I've been a public investor for over thirty years. I've never
sued my broker. I've been an arbitrator in a couple of hundred cases.
I've never granted punitive damages. Not because I sit in New York.
If I see the right case, I'm going to do it, regardless of Fahnestock,29
until Mastrobuono tells me otherwise.29 I am going to do it if I see
the terrible act that I think would warrant it.
MR. LEVINE: Could I just interrupt you. What standard do you
think is applicable in awarding punitive damages? In other words,
what is the legal or just policy statement that is articulated as to when
you make that decision?
PROF. KATSORIS: I haven't had to focus on it yet, because I haven't granted it. I haven't seen the appropriate facts. Like a statement that's been made regarding pornography: "I'll know it when I
see it." I haven't seen it yet in the approximately two hundred cases
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Katsoris, supra note 104.
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238-39 (1987).
Id at 239-40.
Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991).
See generally Scot J. Paltrow, PanelAwards Punitive Damages Against Broker,

L.A. Tunes, Feb. 23, 1995, at D1 (discussing a $70,000 punitive damage award issued
on February 15, 1995 by an arbitration panel sitting in New York).
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that I have sat on. I have great deference for the Second Circuit, but
it would not stop me if I saw the right case in New York.
I might add that in the Fahnestock case, one of the arbitrators was
Mort Goodman, whose background had basically been in representing
the industry. Mort, who recently passed away, was an attorney and
was one of the original public members of SICA. Mort, to his credit,
awarded punitive damages in Fahnestock.
But if we can't negotiate a settlement on the issue of punitive damages, then I think we have to make the arbitration process optional in
such cases.
MR. COLBY: I should note that as a matter of policy, the views I
express are my own and should not be attributed to the Commission
or my colleagues at the SEC.
I would like to mention what Ted said, if I understood right, that
punitive damages could ultimately be destructive to the industry, operating in a manner that didn't have appeal rights and safeguards.
I think the premise in the Mastrobuono brief was that if you have
arbitration without all of the remedies that would be available in court
litigation, including punitive damages, that it is destructive of arbitration. Arbitration becomes a second-class process if you take away
remedies that are available in litigation. If certain remedies are not
available only in arbitration, it will be damaging to the arbitration process itself.
Keep in mind that arbitration is not something that is mandatory for
the customers or the industry. It is written into a contract in order to
engage in business with the industry.
One possible alternative would be, if punitive damages are untenable under current conditions in arbitration, that you develop a different pattern where customers can go to court in cases where they seek
punitive damages-probably not an attractive possibility, but it certainly is one.
And the Commission touched on the appealability issue in its Mastrobuono brief in footnote fourteen. 299 The brief suggested that if an
award was grossly excessive it might also exceed an arbitrator's powers and might be vacated under the Federal Arbitration Act on that
ground.
On the Honda issue, to some extent it is a choice. If you choose to
engage in arbitration where you can't appeal, then you have essentially chosen to not appeal.3° Thus, I think the brief disposes of that
part of the Honda due process argument.
299. SEC Brief, supra note 3, at 20 n.14.
300. See Ware, supra note 133, at 567-68 (citing D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.,
405 U.S. 174 (1972), for the proposition that parties who consent by contract to arbitration expressly waive their due process rights).
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PROF. COFFEE: Bob, let me just push you on one thing you said.
You were speaking of it being destructive of the process if there
wasn't some threat of punitive damages. Now, do you really need punitive damages to protect the process, or do you need something
lesser, like a scaled-down rule?
MR. COLBY: I didn't say that you needed the threat of punitive
damages. I was not trying to address the private attorney general issue, although the Commission historically has been in favor of private
attorneys general and their implied rights of action, and the Commission is in the process of developing positions on tort reform. I also
was not addressing the relative merits of punitive damages. State legislatures and courts have made determinations about whether there
should be such damages. More than forty states have determined that
there should be. What I was trying to say is, it is important to the
credibility and the acceptance of arbitration that you not have
limitations.
PROF. COFFEE: That it mirror the civil law process?
MR. COLBY: Yes, that's right.

MR. DUBOW: I just want to address one issue to Robert, which
illustrates my central theme here. When you say that a person can
obtain punitive damages in court, but cannot obtain them in arbitration, that makes arbitration a second class method of adjudication.
In the State of Massachusetts, one cannot obtain punitive damages
in court, yet in the Raytheon301 case, the plaintiff obtained punitive
damages in arbitration. Therefore, is it the Commission's view that a
client who brings an arbitration in Massachusetts should not obtain
punitive damages because that person couldn't obtain them in court,
and alternatively, does that mean that if the answer is no and that the
person should be able to obtain punitive damages in arbitration in
Massachusetts, does that make the court system second class?
MR. COLBY: My view is that this is governed by state law where
there isn't a discrimination against arbitration. So, if the state law
does not allow punitive damages in court, they should not be allowed
in arbitration. If a state puts a cap on how much is allowed in punitive
damages, that should also apply to arbitration.
MR. DUBOW: Therefore, you would also say that if the state sets
forth a standard, you'd apply that. For example, in some states, wanton and malicious conduct is a standard. In some states, you can't
introduce evidence of wealth. In other states you can. You would
also follow those rules as well?
MR. COLBY: Yes.
MR. CELLA: Listening to the debate, and I've listened to this debate for some years as a member of SICA, I note that the industry
lived well when punitive damages were a fact of life in judicial pro301. Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F2d 6 (ist Cir. 1989).

1672

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

ceedings. They survived. They had no problem. Now that the public
customer is basically compelled to go to arbitration, if you say arbitration should not include the possibility of a punitive damage award,
what you're doing is immunizing the industry from the prophylactic
benefit, not only of an award of punitive damages for a claimant who
deserves them based upon a standard that's met, but the public investor is damaged because the availability of a punishment for gross misconduct is no longer there.
So, are we really saying punitive damages should not be available in
arbitration, or is the real argument that punitive damages should not
be awarded by arbitration panels because they lack the experience,
training, and understanding? That's two different things. And I think
the argument really is the latter and not the former.
PROF. COFFEE: Let me see if I can follow up on that point, because it is a prospective, forward-looking point as to something that
could be done to modify or correct the system so we can marry the
two.
And here I'm going to fall back and rely on the inherent power of
the professor to call on people. This is one of those rights that federal
judges also have. I wonder if we can get Debbie Masucci to tell us a
little bit more about the NASD Notice, which I believe is something
that you're closely related to. It's come out. You've begun to get
some comment, I expect. What's been the reaction? Is this something
that's flying, or is this something that's just getting artillery fire?
MS. MASUCCI: I think it is something that, as you have said, is
getting a lot of artillery fire. The NASD, through its National Arbitration Committee, has been reviewing the whole issue of punitive damages for at least three years.
One area where we thought we had obtained consensus and moved
it forward was the development of an "Offer of Award" proposal, 3"
which is very similar to the proposals that have been in legislative reforms-the loser pays concept. Paul Dubow, as well as Boyd Page,
who is the past president of the Public Investors' Arbitration Bar Association, were involved in the development of the rule.
The rule received extreme criticism for its perceived punitive impact, especially on the small investor. What the critics didn't look at
or focus on was that the rule, as developed by the NASD, only applied
to claims over $250,000 and that it was recommended on a pilot basis.
The rule was crafted for the larger award or larger cases where generally, we are advised, the parties have done their research and know
their case prior to filing. The hostility that arose from that rule
snowballed and the debate then grew quite loud.
302. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 33,081, File No.

SR-NASD-93-36, 58 Fed. Reg. 57881 (Oct. 20, 1993) (proposed rule change to section
41 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure).
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Simultaneously with the National Arbitration Committee viewing
all of the alternatives, our Legal Advisory Board set up a separate
subcommittee to study the issue and develop a report that is compiled
into the Notice to Members. The concept or precept that they started
with was that this is a very regulated industry, but these were the alternatives that everybody has been talking about to address the concerns regarding punitive damages.
Those concerns really were drawn from the fact, not that arbitrators
have not granted punitive damage awards properly in the past, but
that there could be a large punitive damage award from a run-away
panel that might put a firm out of business. So, it is speculation and
fear.
Secondly, regarding the issue of the cost of arbitration. Because of
the threat of punitive damages, each arbitration case is being litigated
more fiercely and costing the parties even more money. Even the
smaller cases.
The report that's contained in the materials was not voted on by the
Legal Advisory Board or the NASD's Board of Governors. It was put
out there for comment. We received some comments. Not a lot. And
the vast majority of them basically suggested that any decision in this
area be put off until either the U.S. Supreme Court decided the Mastrobuono case or our Arbitration Policy Task Force 3 had reviewed
the issue.
So, our posture as a forum right now is to sit back and see what the
environment will bring us, and we don't know what that is.
PROF. COFFEE: Okay. I hope someone at this panel will comment later on whether the prospect of a run-away panel is like the
Lochness Monster, the Unicorn, or whether it is not a mythical beast
but something they've actually seen recently.
MR. EPPENSTEIN: I would like to put forward a different view
getting at what you have just said. Initially, there was this fear of runaway juries and that punitive damages were going to be awarded indiscriminately and were really going to hit the industry hard.
As I recall in New York, the largest award the Second Circuit affirmed was a $1.5 million hit in Aldrich v. Thomson McKinnon.'
They scaled it down from 3 million to 1.5 million. And someone
asked about what standard was used. I remember Judge Duffy wrote
in one of his opinions in that case that he had seen witnesses lie
before, but he never saw anyone's glasses fog up.
Now, I don't see run-away arbitration panels. You certainly won't
see repeaters if they are on. a panel that comes in with a big award,
303. The Arbitration Task Force is also known as the Ruder Committee. See Margaret A. Jacobs, NASD Panel To Study Reforms in Arbitration Process, Wall St. J.,

Aug. 18, 1994, at C1.
304. Aldrich v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 756 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
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because they'll be stricken peremptorily by the industry from every
other panel that they are chosen to sit on.
Rick Ryder addressed the Symposium the first day30 5 and came out
with some figures where he said that the Securities Arbitration Commentator had done a comparison ratio of punitive damages against
compensatory damages when they were awarded in the securities arbitration area, and he found that they were 1.1 to 1 in terms of the ratio. 30 6 He also said that punitive damages were not really awarded in
that many cases. He said there were a total of about two hundred
punitive awards in the history of securities arbitration since he's been
keeping track, and that is much less than ten percent of all cases.30 7
So, I don't really know what the big dispute is about here on punitive damages. I think it is a way to help weed out the rogue brokers
that we see from the claimants' end and the way to help weed out the
rogue offices that we see in this area.
30 8
Domke on Arbitration said that arbitrators seek to do equity.
McMahon said that arbitrators could do whatever courts could do.
From this debate, I think we are getting back into the realm of let's go
to court on all of these issues, and that's what I've been hearing.
And, if I could just address what Mr. Dubow said a little earlier
about the contract that was discussed in the Wall Street Journal recently.30 9 My memory is that in that contract the brokerage firm has
the right to go to court to stop the claimant from bringing a claim on a
statute of limitations ground or on a six-year eligibility ground.
The contract also provides that for the statute of limitations, the law
of the state of the claimant's residence will apply, not New York law.
The brokerage firm wanted to apply New York law to punitive damages, but not to the statute of limitations.
Why? Because we have a six-year statute of limitations for breach
of fiduciary duty, which is where you usually get your big award, even
your big compensatory award. So, the firm wanted to go in and try to
cut that out if it was going to find a claimant in a state, outside New
York, that has a statute of limitations shorter than six years.
I just find in the pre-dispute arbitration clause area, where firms are
now attempting to place limitations on customers and also in the punitive damage area, that we're heading back into the courtroom, and I
don't think it is worth it. I think the industry ought to think about the
perceptions that are being placed on it.
305. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
306. See Punitive Award Survey, Sec. Arb. Commentator, May 1993, at 4; see also
PunitiveDamages in Arbitration: Update Survey of Securities ArbitrationAwards, Sec.
Arb. Commentator, Jan. 1995, at 15 (reporting that in the updated survey the ratio is
1.0 to 1).
307. See PunitiveAward Survey, supra note 306, at 3-4, 7.
308. Domke on Commercial Arbitration (Wilner ed. 1994).
309. See Siconolfi, supra note 109, at C1.
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First you argue: Get everyone into arbitration because it's going to
be great for the claimant, and it's going to be great for us, it's going to
cut our costs, we're not going to have to worry about large awards,
and now you're picking away at that order and want to get rid of these
punitive damage awards and want to limit the claimant on what he can
recover. I think the perception of that is going to be very harmful.
MR. THOMPSON: We've been talking today about a process that
really had its origins as a lay process, if I may use that term. It is
becoming more and more legalistic largely because, I think, the law
has become more sophisticated. But my question doesn't really concern the whole issue of punitive damages as much as an ancillary, but
very important, issue that was raised in the Wall Street Journal article
that Paul referred to, and that was a quote by Arthur Levitt, in which
he said, "I have a problem with agreements that couch prohibitions 31in0
[small] type, or in language that is incomprehensible to investors.
I was listening to Paul discuss the three points. He was having to
really put an interpretation on at least two of those points, and Paul is
an attorney and also very familiar with this area; but, put yourself in
the shoes of the average investor who is trying to understand what it is
that he or she is agreeing to.
My question is, don't we have an obligation to translate this if it's
going to become more legalistic-to translate this into language the
average investor can understand?
PROF. COFFEE: We might ask the SEC here. Is that part of their
responsibility?
MR. COLBY: I think if it continues, we absolutely have an obligation to make it comprehensible.
MR. LEVINE: May I just say, not speaking for either my firm or
for the industry, that I don't believe the way to go is to go back to
court. And I don't believe the way to go is to have a voluntary access
to court.
The one thing that hasn't been articulated, I think part of the mix,
Gus, is there has to be some discipline brought into the process of
bringing the claim if you permit it into the arbitration arena because a
lot of our concern is not the actual filing. I think the statistics speak
for themselves.
It is the overhang in terms of dealing with the resolution of the matter before the arbitration's filed that creates the problem. And the
reason you haven't seen a lot of arbitration punitive demands more
than you already have is because there's been the in terrorem effect of
all this discussion as to whether Garrity applies, where it goes. Essentially there's a lot of noise in the system.
I believe that you have to resolve this issue in the arbitration process, not by going to court, because if you go to court, I think you will
310. Id. (alteration in original).
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both hurt clients and hurt the firms for different reasons. So, I think
this is the right forum to resolve this issue, not the judicial forum.
PROF. COFFEE: You said there has to be some discipline, presumably on the plaintiffs' side, in deciding what claim to bring forward. Isn't there some discipline in the fact that the plaintiff has to go
out and find an attorney who either will take a fee or will have to
appraise this as having a worthwhile contingent prospect?
MR. LEVINE: You are one of the most sophisticated lawyers I
know, John, and that question scares me because if the solicitation
throughout the country by plaintiffs' lawyers or firms is any indication
of that discipline, I haven't seen it in terms of the ability of that kind
of in terrorem effect in terms of bringing a claim.
What I was looking for is, there's got to be some mechanisms to
either strike a frivolous action or penalize the party who brought it, as
there is in the judicial context. If you don't have that, it is very easy to
bring the case, especially if you don't award fees to losers or winners,
as you heard.31 ' If there's no process for disciplining that, then there's
no incentive not to do it at all. That's what I am concerned about in
the process.
MS. MASUCCI: One of the problems that we've been facing as
administrators is the folklore surrounding any award of punitive
damages.
In our discussions with the industry, they really would want to know
more or less why arbitrators in a particular case issued a punitive damage award. You know, cite the facts as well as the law that gave them
that authority.
The folklore that I'm talking about is that in the past there have
been some cases where arbitrators just said we're awarding $20,000 in
punitive damages, and the speculation afterwards was, well this really
wasn't a punitive damage case. They wanted to give the claimant his
or her attorneys' fees.
At the NASD, we've been encouraging arbitrators, in view of the
fact that there's no requirement to do so, to identify facts that will
specify their authority to award punitive damages so that the parties
don't have to guess the authority relied upon.
It's likely that with arbitrators explaining more in their decisions,
the parties will become more confident that arbitrators are making the
proper decisions on a case-by-case basis.
PROF. COFFEE: You want a common law system with precedents.
I don't know if we have more comments on this issue. We do have, in
311. See Stephen Labaton, Committee Approves Bill To Set Limits On Lawsuits,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1995, at A15 (reporting that the House Judiciary Committee
approved tort reform legislation that would provide for a loser-pays rule, as well as
imposition of mandatory fines on lawyers for bringing frivolous lawsuits).
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this procedure, the contemplation that there will be questions. Do
people have specific questions?
MS. ZUCHLEWSKI: Professor, before we leave the topic of punitive damages, we spent a considerable amount of time this morning
talking about employment discrimination disputes going to arbitration.3 12 I would like to point out, because we've been talking about
business disputes throughout this discussion, that there is the issue of
punitive damages in the specific context of employment discrimination cases.
I think what's happened here is that the industry is taking the
anomalous position of saying people can get their rights adequately
adjudicated in the arbitration forum, but not permitting them to seek
the punitive damages that they would be entitled to if they went to
federal court under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which I note has a
cap on damages.313
So, when you think about punitive damages, although the employment discrimination cases are a very small minority of the cases at this
point, that issue at least should be considered and be addressed.
MR. MADDOX: I'm from Indianapolis, and I'm a director of the
Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association.
I want to comment on one of Gus' comments that he thinks that,
perhaps after we get the Mastrobuono decision, the punitive damages
discussion might go differently than it has the last three years. I guess
I can't share that optimism presently. I'm relatively new to the debate. I've sat through a couple of the sort of SRO-brokered discussions that were held this past year. And it became clear to me right
312. See supra pp. 1613-42.
313. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), "Damages in cases of intentional discrimination in employment," provides:
(b) Compensatory and Punitive Damages
(3) Limitations
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under
this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded
under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than
101 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current
or preceding calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer that
201 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current
or preceding calendar year, $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than
501 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current
or preceding calendar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in
each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
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out of the gate that there's no consensus on the industry side about
this issue.
Some individuals, some decision-makers in certain firms, have
drawn the line in the sand, have just said no punitive damages under
any circumstances. Others seem to be a little more willing to talk
about meeting halfway.
On the plaintiffs' bar side, it is the same thing. Some of our members really feel that there should be an unfettered right to punitive
damages, and others are willing to talk about meeting halfway.
In the environment, though, even if one of those sides actually wins
one of those extreme points with the Mastrobuono decision, I guess, I
don't see what's necessarily going to change that environment.
I do echo the concern that removing punitive damages from the
arbitration process could deteriorate the process even further. You
know, I see punitive damages as just a component of a bigger problem, really, and that is the exportation of New York law to the rest of
the country. When we sit in arbitration hearings in Indianapolis, and
we look out the window, we don't see Manhattan-we see the Indiana
statehouse.
Our general assembly and our court system have developed a cer.tain body of law for our residents, which the vast majority of the public customers that I've encountered don't waive in any sort of an
informed or knowledgeable fashion when they decide to do business
with a brokerage firm.
The barriers that we see the industry attempt to erect, through the
New York choice-of-law clause, and the result in different remedies, a
different remedy for those investors in arbitration, as opposed to what
they would get at the courthouse, I think is a real problem.
If those barriers at some point become too high and the potential
remedies become so different, then I think the public may ultimately
get strong enough to do something about possibly getting back into
the courthouse.
In addition, the punitive damage issue, if it goes against the public
investor, is going to add to those barriers.
But, Gus, I wish I could share your optimism about how those discussions are going to go after Mastrobuono, but it's been one of the
toughest issues I've ever encountered. With one side potentially winning after Mastrobuono, I just don't see it changing.

